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A HUMAN RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY: FOR AND AGAINST 
CHRISTOPH HANISCH* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The idea that every person has a moral right to live in a democratic society 
has met staunch opposition in normative political theorizing. People shrink 
back from endorsing the claim that those in power violate a fundamental right 
when they deny some or all of their subjects an equal and fair say in the 
processes of legitimizing the monopolized force that citizens are subject to. 
Many of the opponents of a human right to democracy (HRD) presume a 
specific functional role that human rights are supposed to play in the 
international realm. According to the functionalist, it is a defining feature of a 
human right that its violation sufficiently undermines a state’s legitimacy and 
licenses (some think, even requires) humanitarian intervention. Endorsing 
HRD would then imply that all non-democratic regimes were rightly subject to 
diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and even military force on the part of the 
international community. This is philosophically implausible and politically 
dangerous. HRD must therefore be rejected. 
In this paper I defend the possibility of HRD against this particular 
objection. Defending the claim that HRD is possible amounts to establishing a 
specific conceptual space that the functionalist opponents rule out. This 
conceptual space makes room for the defense of HRD, without that implying 
that a violation of that right licenses (let alone necessitates) the use of military 
means to put an end to its violation. The right to democracy might turn out to 
be a human right and we should not be afraid of endorsing it because of the 
supposed inconvenient and embarrassing implications that functionalists are 
worried about. The definitional question of what human rights there are is a 
question that can and must be addressed independently of what should be done 
in response to their violation. 
Since the argument presented here “only” establishes the possibility of 
HRD we cannot commit ourselves to any of the many positive arguments in 
support of it. Rather, I leave it open how the conceptual space defended here is 
filled in (actually, the argument presented here even leaves it open if that space 
can be filled in at all). My aim in this paper is to show that a certain kind of 
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objection to HRD is misguided and that we shouldn’t reject HRD on its basis. 
However, my argument turns out to be more ambitious than it might appear at 
first. A number of implications and complications arises in the course of 
HRD’s defense. The argument suggests, for example, that a human rights 
violation in and of itself (i.e., absent any additional welfarist considerations) is 
never sufficient grounds for humanitarian intervention, a suggestion that many 
will find too extreme and that is defended towards the end of the paper. 
II.  DEMOCRACY AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY 
Recent political philosophy and normative legal theory have seen an 
increased interest in the question of whether international human rights should 
include an entitlement to live in a democratic society with a representative 
form of government. In this section I briefly highlight the features of 
democracy that for many make it the proper object of a human right, i.e., an 
individual moral right with respect to which there is sufficient justification to 
transform it into a legal right that all citizens can enforce. This moral right is 
one that all human beings have, regardless of their historical, cultural, and 
geographical location; it is a universal human right.1 Needless to say, the 
corresponding positive legal right to democracy remains currently unrealized 
and under-fulfilled, but the point of the following reflections is that the 
regulative ideal of striving towards the realization of a world in which all 
humans have that legal right is a morally valid claim. That HRD is a moral 
right means that all humans actually possess it and its possession amounts to 
the universal claim to live in political and legal arrangements that honor the 
content of that claim in the form of a legally enforceable right to participation 
in the democratic authorization of those who execute and administer the state-
monopoly of coercion. 
HRD has been criticized on many grounds. One objection, that HRD 
shares with many other controversial human rights (social and economic ones 
in particular), is that such a right fails to fit into the traditional Hohfeldian 
framework with its central idea of claim rights.2 HRD, as opposed to negative 
 
 1. Alyssa R. Bernstein, Human Rights, Global Justice, and Disaggregated States: John 
Rawls, Onora O’Neill, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 66 AM. J. ECON. AND SOC. 87, 87 (2007). It 
does not constitute a qualification of the claim defended here that certain persons are not holders 
of that moral right, e.g., children or adults with mental diseases. It is a far more controversial 
issue if, for example, prisoners or resident aliens can be excluded from the human right to 
democracy. I put these controversial cases aside for the purposes of this paper. 
 2. See Wilfried Hinsch & Markus Stepanians, Human Rights as Moral Claim Rights, in 
RAWLS’S LAW OF PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA? 117–30 (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy eds., 
2006). The Hohfeldian framework supposes that the Constitution and its Amendments are a list of 
immunities as opposed to liberties or privileges. Stuart Macdonald, Why We Should Abandon the 
Balance Metaphor: A New Approach to Counterterrorism Policy, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
95, 132–33 (2008). 
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individual rights to bodily integrity, conscience, association, etc., fails to 
generate corresponding duties and this turns it into an impractical device for 
the purposes of international legality. This objection can be overcome though. 
HRD’s addressees are those in power, that is those who currently hold the 
Weberian monopoly of the legitimate use of violence over a certain set of 
individuals, namely subjects and citizens.3 HRD submits that all human 
individuals have a positive moral claim to, firstly, live in a state that maintains 
the rule of law and, secondly, that this state is a democratic one.4 Those who 
are in the position to violate this universal human right are, on the one hand, 
fellow citizens (when they, for example, coercively prevent others from 
voting) and, more importantly, the state officials who have it in their hands to 
either actively promote reforms toward democracy or at least remove obstacles 
that lie in the path of such reforms. These requirements result in the positive 
claim that citizens have with respect to their society’s basic institutional 
structure and with respect to those individual and collective agents who occupy 
those positions to influence its design.5 
A further preliminary that has to be settled at the outset concerns the object 
of HRD. Many misgivings regarding the prospects of HRD have to do with the 
plethora of, and often incompatible, definitions of “democracy.” Related to 
these definitional quandaries is a standard problem that one encounters in the 
current debates. Opponents to HRD (but also its defenders) often presume an 
extremely demanding (and controversial) conception of democracy; one that 
even in well-developed democracies hardly meets with unanimous approval.6 
These demanding conceptions tie democracy to substantive egalitarian social 
and economic policies, ideals of virtuous citizenship, and notions of 
meaningful public deliberation and discourse.7 Similar to the many cases of 
other human rights, it is no surprise then that such demanding conceptions of 
democracy will appear unrealistic candidates for HRD’s content. Not even 
 
 3. See Macdonald, supra note 2, at 120–21. I am, of course, aware of the numerous 
empirical complications that come with this presumption of clearly delineated political units. It is 
not denied here at all that some real world states “fail,” in exactly the sense that they 
unsuccessfully try to establish and maintain a Weberian monopoly over a certain group of 
individuals. 
 4. Heather Lardy, Translating Human Rights Into Moral Demands on Government, 9 INT’L 
LEGAL THEORY 123, 131–33 (2003). 
 5. Matthew J. Lister, There is No Human Right to Democracy: But May We Promote It 
Anyway?, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 257, 260–61 (2012). One has to distinguish between a violation of 
HRD and its “under-fulfillment.” A currently non-democratic regime that sincerely promotes its 
reform towards a truly democratic one does not violate its citizens’ HRD even though that right as 
yet remains unrealized. See id. at 274. 
 6. See id. at 268. 
 7. Andreas Follesdal, Justice, Stability, and Toleration in a Federation of Well-Ordered 
Peoples, in RAWLS’S LAW OF PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA? 309–10 (Rex Martin & David A. 
Reidy eds., 2006). 
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very advanced democratic societies adhere to these moral ideals in their current 
and foreseen actual politics and legislation. They not only refuse to do so 
because they are not progressive enough; rather, the details of how to spell out 
the core ideas of democracy are disputed and subject to controversies. It is, for 
example, a complex question in comparative political theory if Anglophone 
two-party-democracies are more or less democratic than continental European 
multi-party electoral systems. 
That democracy comes in many different institutional and cultural forms is 
the main reason for why the following argument employs a very minimal 
threshold conception of HRD’s object. It is a threshold conception because it 
presents a minimal level that a society’s institutions must pass in order to count 
as a democracy. For the purposes of our discussion it does not matter what 
happens above that threshold (though that does not mean that these questions 
are irrelevant from the point of view of domestic justice). State A, barely 
passing the threshold, counts as satisfying HRD in the same way as does state 
B, a “democratic paradise” in which robust notions of social and political 
justice are fully realized and in which all citizens participate in collective will 
formation processes as free and equal persons. 
Now what does this threshold notion of democracy amount to? At a 
minimum, democracy has certain negative functions, first and foremost that it 
provides the lawful means to replace (or confirm) those currently in charge of 
the three branches of government on a regular basis.8 Benign hereditary 
monarchies fail to satisfy this minimum criterion, as do more obviously 
undemocratic cases like authoritarian dictatorships. The second constitutive 
feature of a democratic regime concerns the lawful means just mentioned. 
Free, fair, and regular elections, in which those who are determined who 
occupy the state offices, are considered the essence of institutionalizing a 
procedure that realizes the desideratum of all individuals being able to lead a 
non-dominated life.9 
 
 8. Leonardo Morlino, What is a “Good” Democracy?: Theory and Empirical Analysis 2, 
Presentation at the University of California, Berkeley Conference: The European Union, Nations 
State, and the Quality of Democracy (Oct. 31–Nov. 2, 2002) (on file with the University of 
California, Berkeley Institute of European Studies). Of course, the opportunities to replace those 
in the juridical branch are, first, indirect ones and, second, do not take place as regularly as 
elections do. There are good reasons for this that and for removing certain offices from the 
influences of the election cycle I cannot consider in this paper. Still, life-long tenure for judges 
and justices does not undermine the claim that the democratically constituted will of all is 
ultimately the basis of these offices’ authority. INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL 
ASSISTANCE, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 4 (2014). Even if it sometimes takes quite long to do so, 
the composition of the US Supreme Court is ultimately changed by democratic decisions, 
mediated by elected officials who then appoint and confirm the justices. Id. 
 9. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 189–
92 (1997). Those familiar with Philip Pettit’s work on republicanism will certainly be reminded 
of his conception of “freedom as non-domination” when they acknowledge the above account of 
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Probably the most controversial feature of the minimal threshold 
conception of democracy is the egalitarian demand “one person one vote.” 
While the outright exclusion of a subset of all qualified citizens from voting 
clearly conflicts with the normative ideal of non-domination that underlies the 
other two features (having no vote at all renders one into a passive subject at 
the whims of those who have such a vote and of those the latter elect to rule), it 
is more difficult to establish that minimal democracy remains always 
objectionably under-fulfilled in case certain groups have more influence at the 
polls than others (as a matter of legal entitlement).10 Suffice it for the moment 
to highlight that not only the historical trajectory clearly points towards the 
gradual egalitarian inclusion of more and more adult citizens into the 
electorate. More importantly, we must remind ourselves that the minimal 
threshold notion of democracy that I suggest for the distinct purpose of an 
argument for HRD is not the end of the story regarding social and political 
justice. Withholding equal voting power from certain citizens can certainly be 
ruled out on other, justice-based, grounds. However, the abstract idea of 
democracy in and of itself, with the above-mentioned emphasis on having 
some say in determining whether those in power continue to do so, does not yet 
seem to necessitate the equal distribution of influence. I leave this controversy 
aside. 
Putting together this minimal notion of democracy with the above 
conception of human rights, we arrive at the following notion of HRD (the 
possibility of which the next sections are going to defend). HRD is a universal 
individual (not a collective) right that every (adult) human person actually has, 
 
democracy. And indeed, the minimal threshold conception, designed for the purpose of figuring 
in HRD, amounts to a fairly republican version of democracy that emphasizes the idea that 
democracy’s attractiveness rests fundamentally on its defensive and negative functions as 
opposed to its more demanding active dimensions in terms of collective self-legislation. Id. The 
latter are of course important normative ideals but focusing on them is another source of the 
resistance to HRD that is this paper’s concern. 
 10. See Jason Brennan, Against Democracy (2016) (unpublished manuscript); BRYAN 
CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 1–3 
(2007) (attacking the value of participating in democratic processes). This inegalitarian version of 
democracy does not merely come in the form of racist, sexist, and classist varieties. Recently, 
some have advocated lottery mechanisms in order to replace the one person one vote principle. 
Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L. J. 1283, 1283 
(1984). Others, especially libertarian critics of democracy, have called into question the 
importance of symmetrical and equal shares of democratic authorization on epistemological 
grounds, calling into question the rationality and/or knowledge of voters. See CAPLAN, supra, at 
3. I mention this to highlight that attacks on the one-person-one-vote principle cannot be tossed 
aside as mere relics from times long gone. The minimal threshold notion of democracy, 
deliberatively designed for HRD, has to acknowledge that egalitarian democracy is more difficult 
to justify than democracy simpliciter. 
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everywhere and at all times.11 It is a moral right that consists in the claim, 
against those who are in the relevant positions of institutional power, to 
promote (or at least not to resist) the establishing and maintenance of a legal 
order that passes a minimum threshold of democratic standards. Citizens who 
live in a political society that honors HRD are regularly given the legally 
established and protected opportunity to decide, in free and fair elections, 
whether those in power should be replaced by others or not.12 
III.  FOR AND AGAINST A HUMAN RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY 
The recent opposition to HRD has one of its main inspirations in the highly 
influential political philosophy of John Rawls.13 Towards the end of his career, 
Rawls dedicated most of his work to the issue of global justice. His The Law of 
Peoples presents a “realistically utopian” vision of the international order that 
is very skeptical of the claims put forward by more ambitious liberal thinkers.14 
An egalitarian liberal himself concerning domestic justice, Rawls’ just global 
order is extremely cautious when it comes to imposing liberal and democratic 
standards on non-liberal and nondemocratic peoples and states. The category 
of “decent [but non-liberal] societies”15 plays a central role in Rawls’ approach 
that many have criticized as disappointingly conservative, given the 
progressive and egalitarian conclusions that Rawls draws regarding domestic 
social, economic, and political justice.16 
Important for our discussion is that decent societies are internally 
nondemocratic and non-liberal but are nevertheless full (and equal) members 
of Rawls’ society of peoples.17 They are nondemocratic because those in 
power, while not entirely unreceptive to their subjects’ needs and preferences, 
restrict political participation to a so-called “consultation hierarchy,” a 
mechanism that falls short of any kind of democratic entitlements to participate 
 
 11. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 87. 
 12. See Christoph Hanisch, An Autonomy-Centered Defense of Democracy, 53 INT’L PHIL. 
Q. *23–24 (2013). Elsewhere I try to establish the stronger claim that all competent human adults 
actually have a moral obligation to participate in the democratic will formation processes of their 
society. This argument, building on Kant’s thought that we have an unconditional duty to 
establish a “rightful condition,” lends support to the idea that there might be a legal requirement 
to vote. I obviously cannot discuss this controversy here but emphasize that such a universal 
obligation implies that a conclusive case can be made for a human right to democracy. If HRD 
cannot be established, it follows that the obligation fails to materialize (but not the other way 
round). 
 13. Thomas Christiano, An Instrumental Argument for a Human Right to Democracy, 39 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 142, 142 (2011). 
 14. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 11–12 (1999). 
 15. Id. at 71–78. 
 16. Fernando R. Tesón, The Rawlsian Theory of International Law, 9 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 
79, 88, 94 (1995); Charles R. Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples, 110 ETHICS 669, 678 (2000). 
 17. See Tesón, supra note 16, at 79–80. 
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(though it allows citizens to nonviolently protest in case they think their 
government acts without paying any attention to their needs and preferences). 
Decent societies are non-liberal because they distribute fundamental rights and 
liberties (such as freedom of conscience, religion, and association) on an 
unequal and discriminatory basis. Rawls’ hypothetical example of a decent 
society, the Islamic republic of “Kazanistan,” promotes an established state 
religion, membership in which determines access to political power and public 
offices.18 Moreover, Kazanistan does not protect equal freedom of conscience 
and speech (though it protects some of it for each citizen).19 Rawls presents a 
list of requirements that every society has to satisfy in order to count as a 
decent one and the final requirement concerns the extent to which even decent 
states and governments are required to protect and honor a short list of human 
rights.20 In so far as societies respect this minimal set of human rights (rights to 
subsistence, security, free conscience (though not equal), personal property, 
and freedom from slavery and serfdom) and are not threatening neighboring 
states, they are passing Rawls’ threshold of international legitimacy and are 
equal members of the society of peoples that they populate together with 
liberal democracies.21 Crucially, passing this threshold of respecting human 
rights (plus external non-aggression) suffices to render these decent societies 
immune to external interference and humanitarian intervention.22 Decent 
societies are as legitimate as liberal democracies are for the purposes of 
establishing their equal standing as members of the global society of peoples. 
This concern with the status of societies as minimally decent (and hence as 
being immune to infringements of their sovereignty) is crucial for 
understanding Rawls’ method of determining the nature and content of his 
Spartan international human rights schedule and for explicitly excluding 
democratic rights from it. His theory of international relations rests on the 
premise that it must be realistically utopian and part of this premise is to 
assign human rights a specific function.23 This function is that human rights are 
part of the realistic (“reasonable”24) standards for judging societies’ legitimacy 
from the point of view of the international community. What human rights 
(there) are is determined and constrained by reflecting on this functional role 
that they are supposed to play in the Rawlsian argument for international 
legitimacy.25 This functionalism about human rights (the target of this paper), 
 
 18. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 75–76. 
 19. See THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 75–78. 
 20. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 64–65. 
 21. See THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 78–82. 
 22. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 67. 
 23. See THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 78. 
 24. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212–254 (1993). 
 25. Id. 
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together with the commitment to present a “realistic” theory, then results in a 
list of human rights that many regard as too unambitious, especially when 
compared with actually existing international human rights documents and 
legislation that include HRD such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, to name just the most prominent one.26 
We have to understand Rawls’ account of human rights because many of 
his defenders have significantly expanded the functionalist method in their 
accounts of human rights. It is the premise that international legitimacy is of 
prime concern for the definition of human rights that renders these “political 
conceptions of human rights” so minimalistic with respect to their outcomes. 
Additionally, this is why Rawls refers to the aforementioned members of his 
short list as “human rights proper” (a strategy often employed by minimalists 
and discussed in the next section).27 He uses this label in order to distinguish 
these rights that truly deserve to be called human rights from other, supposedly 
less urgent and important, ones. Rawls suggests that these derivative rights do 
not have enough to do with a society’s immunity regarding external 
intervention and its international legitimacy.28 It is only “outlaw states,” states 
that are externally aggressive and that violate the internal standards of minimal 
decency (the Rawlsian schedule of human rights) that disqualifies them from 
membership in the society of peoples.29 With respect to these regimes third 
parties are justified to use means that are normally incompatible with 
respecting state sovereignty. 
Even though Rawls’ remarks on human rights are brief they have had a 
lasting impact on the debate regarding HRD and can be regarded as one of the 
founding statements of what I will call from now on “functionalist 
minimalism” regarding method and content of human rights. Rawls’ explicit 
rejection of the idea that democratic forms of government (along the lines 
presented in the previous section) are a necessary feature of all societies that 
join the global society of legitimate peoples has inspired the position of those 
 
 26. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 46 (1992). 
 27. See THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 80 n.23. 
 28. Alyssa R. Bernstein, A Human Right to Democracy? Legitimacy and Intervention, in 
RAWLS’S LAW OF PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA? 278, 281 (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy eds., 
2006). 
 29. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 63. Rawls’ taxonomy of societies is actually 
more complex and includes, in addition to liberal societies, decent societies, and outlaw regimes, 
also so called burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 
14, at 63. For the purposes of this paper I put these other cases, and the implications for political 
rights that come with them, to one side and focus on the critical point that even decent societies, 
while nondemocratic, are entitled to full and equal membership in Rawls’ society of peoples. 
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who defend a “minimalism about human rights.”30 These philosophers and 
legal scholars acknowledge that the Rawlsian conception of human rights 
constitutes a significant departure from the global political consensus that has 
dominated the international arena after the Second World War. Most of the 
influential human rights documents, above all the UDHR, comprise a 
significantly more comprehensive list of human rights.31 A larger number of 
individual liberty rights (like equal freedom of speech and religion), social and 
economic rights, and substantive political participation rights in the form of 
HRD distinguish actual human rights practice from Rawlsian minimalism and 
from the functionalist paradigm. 
However, for the purposes of this paper we are not interested in restating 
the facts about the current content of international human rights documents. 
Interested in normative questions we want to know if the more ambitious 
accounts of human rights can be justified. The fact that the post-World War II 
debates regarding what counts and what doesn’t count as a proper member of 
the list of human rights has exhibited the expansion of these lists does not 
suffice to answer the question of whether this trajectory should be welcomed 
and promoted. Rawls and his followers do not deny that the many actual 
developments and decisions concerning human rights run counter to their 
recommendation32; but in this paper we focus on the question of whether one 
should find that recommendation better justified than those that underlie the 
movement to enlarge the list of human rights. 
The core of the argument for human rights minimalism is to draw a sharp 
distinction between justice and international legitimacy. As mentioned above, 
according to Rawls’ exposition even decent societies like Kazanistan must 
incorporate some “consultation hierarchies” and they must act in accordance 
with some conception of the common good.33 Legitimacy, in the sense of 
unqualified state sovereignty, is secured by nondemocratic regimes if they 
arrange their political and legal decision-making by somehow taking into 
consideration the interests of their subjects. Such decent legitimate regimes are 
not fully just societies. Respecting the demands of decency is merely a 
necessary condition for being a just society in the comprehensive egalitarian 
and liberal sense that Rawlsians defend in the domestic case and that very 
much incorporates democracy as an indispensable component.34 
 
 30. See also Joshua Cohen, Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?, 
12 J. POL. PHIL. 190, 190 (2004); Lister, supra note 5, at 257; David A. Reidy, On The Human 
Right to Democracy: Searching for Sense Without Stilts, 43 J. SOC. PHIL. 177, 177 (2012). 
 31. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 80 n.23. 
 32. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 75, 78–80; POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 
24, at liii–iv. 
 33. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 78. 
 34. See THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 80 n.23. 
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According to Rawls’ followers, the mistake that defenders of HRD make is 
that they confuse the issue of standards of international legitimacy with the 
issue of standards of justice. The defenders of HRD wrongly employ the 
criteria of liberal justice as the criteria of a regime’s global legitimacy.35 
Hence, what sounds like two contradictory claims is one of the central 
Rawlsian tenants: while the truth of the matter is that all societies should, in 
one sense, be liberal and democratic ones this is not true in the sense of 
“should” that is of relevance when the limits of state sovereignty are at stake. 
There is no contradiction according to the Rawlsian position to claim that a 
certain subset of all unjust societies nevertheless passes the threshold of 
international legitimacy and sovereignty, namely the decent ones. 
However, even acknowledging the distinction between (complete liberal) 
justice and international legitimacy that characterizes the Rawlsian view, we 
still do not get a complete explanation of why the functionalist paradigm ends 
up endorsing the minimalist schedule of human rights that excludes HRD. 
After all, if it turned out that the standards of international legitimacy include 
democratic forms of government then the worse for Rawls’ decent 
(nondemocratic) societies. They would then simply be illegitimate regimes and 
in turn be subject to potential third party intervention. HRD would then be part 
of the minimum of “human rights proper.” Connecting human rights with the 
idea of legitimacy (as opposed to justice) is therefore not enough to defeat 
HRD. The basic functionalist move of defining human rights in terms of what 
is necessary for a state to be immune to third party intervention merely pushes 
back the crucial question regarding HRD onto the level of determining what 
(international) legitimacy consists in. 
At this point a suspicion arises: The Rawlsian camp simply seems to 
presume that democracy obviously cannot be a criterion of international 
legitimacy and hence, given their functionalist approach of defining human 
rights in terms of legitimacy, violating the norms constitutive of democratic 
institutions, cannot amount to a human rights violation on the part of potential 
members of the society of peoples.36 The conclusion that there is no HRD 
therefore ultimately rests on the (controversial) premise that securing 
democratic forms of government is a threshold too demanding and 
controversial for international legitimacy. The problem is that this presumption 
is never argued for in a satisfying manner but nevertheless drives the argument 
against HRD in the form of a seemingly obvious and uncontroversial starting 
point. We see this when we consider the implications of what would be the 
consequences for functionalist minimalism if, contrary to what is regularly 
silently presumed, democracy turned out to be a standard of international 
legitimacy: HRD would materialize! Regimes that deny democratic 
 
 35. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 278. 
 36. LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 71–73. 
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participation would be illegitimate and therefore possible objects of forceful 
military intervention. Since this was the case it would follow that democratic 
rights turn out to be human rights (proper) after all. 
IV.  BERNSTEIN’S FUNCTIONALIST MINIMALISM 
Let us look at one specific example that illustrates minimalism about 
human rights and that shows why the shift towards the issue of legitimacy does 
not succeed in conclusively undermining the case for HRD. Discussing (and 
defending) Rawls’ account of human rights, Alyssa Bernstein argues against 
HRD.37 Bernstein too emphasizes that the demanding catalogues of 
requirements of (liberal) justice must not get confused with the question of 
what states have to do in order to pass the threshold of legitimacy that renders 
them immune to potential external intervention.38 Only the violation of truly 
“basic human rights” (the ones that Rawls enumerates in The Law of 
Peoples39) undermines legitimacy and, hence, the sovereignty of the state in 
question. Only when basic human rights get violated, is intervention justified. 
It is therefore crucial for Bernstein’s argument to present a principled way to 
distinguish basic from derivative human rights. Bernstein is aware that the 
strategy of singling out a subset of human rights (and labeling them “basic”) 
because they are required for legitimacy has to be careful not to commit the 
fallacy of “begging the question.” She recognizes that “one must also make 
sure, if possible, not to interpret the idea of basic human rights in a way that 
logically presupposes or requires democratic governmental institutions (nor, 
conversely, in a way that logically implies that they cannot require them); 
otherwise the question gets begged.”40 
This important insight notwithstanding, Bernstein’s own argument for 
excluding HRD from the set of basic human rights seems to commit exactly 
that fallacy. She introduces a further legitimacy-relevant category that she calls 
“the minimum respect-for-justice condition” and this standard is another 
condition of a government’s legitimacy.41 Things get interesting when we look 
at Bernstein’s specification of what the minimum respect-for-justice condition 
amounts to. The two features of the minimum that Bernstein mentions are, 
firstly, the citizens’ right to peacefully protest against perceived injustices 
committed by their government and, secondly, the citizens’ right that their 
government not merely lets them protest but makes a “good-faith attempt to 
settle the conflict in a way that the people can see as giving due weight to their 
 
 37. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 278–98. 
 38. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 288. 
 39. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 285–86. 
 40. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 287. 
 41. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 287. 
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claims.”42 These characteristics resemble the definition of Rawls’ “consultation 
hierarchies” (the presence of which renders societies into decent ones) and 
Bernstein claims that these two features of the minimum respect-for-justice 
condition “are quite weak or uncontroversial.”43 
Putting aside the worry that the two features might turn out to be 
everything but weak and uncontroversial (depending on how they are spelled 
out), it is the concluding step in Bernstein’s argument that is crucial for our 
purposes. She claims that accepting the two features of the minimum (and 
nothing above and beyond them) renders this condition of government 
legitimacy “plausible and avoids begging the question.”44 If, on the other hand, 
the minimum incorporated something along the lines of democratic forms of 
government “then the proposed condition is too strong and begs the question. 
The strong interpretation states liberal criteria of a just society [as opposed to 
legitimacy-criteria].”45 
How does this maneuver of pushing back the question of what candidate 
rights count as basic human rights onto the level of the minimum respect-for-
justice condition help determining the status of HRD? The line that Bernstein 
tries to draw between those rights-based requirements that are part of the 
minimum and those that are not seems arbitrary and question begging in 
exactly the way that she rightly regards as unacceptable. She claims that the 
right to protest and the right to have one’s interests acknowledged by the 
government (but nothing more than that) are un-controversially constitutive of 
the minimum and this turns the legitimacy-condition of respecting the minimum 
into a “plausible” one that “avoids begging the question.”46 At this point, the 
defender of HRD will simply reply that this claim exactly begs the question. 
Why does the legitimacy condition of the minimum become “implausible” and 
“too strong” when it incorporates democratic rights? That this implausibility 
ensues simply seems to be presumed in Bernstein’s argument. It is exactly the 
controversial point at stake whether or not democracy is the exclusive object of 
a demanding conception of liberal justice as opposed to being part of the 
narrow Rawlsian set of basic human rights and of the minimum respect-for-
justice condition. Even if we grant that a state must honor the minimum in 
order to count as legitimate (and is thereby immune to external intervention), 
we need a substantive argument for why this minimum is as narrow and 
austere as Bernstein suggests and why democratic institutions are not part of it. 
Instead of avoiding begging the question, the argument that legitimacy consists 
in respecting the minimum too merely presumes that, given our current 
 
 42. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 287–88. 
 43. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 288. 
 44. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 288. 
 45. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 288. 
 46. See Bernstein, supra note 28 at 288. 
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practices concerning international legitimacy, it is “unreasonable” to include 
equal democratic participation among the demands that legitimate 
governments respect in order to be equal members of the society of peoples.47 
Bernstein’s attempt to present a non-question begging way to exclude 
HRD from the schedule of the most urgent and important (“basic”) human 
rights is symptomatic for the current state of the debate: at some point in the 
argument the critics of HRD appeal to the supposed implausibility and to the 
overly demanding implications of including democracy in the core of the 
requirements that determine a society’s legitimacy. My suggestion in the 
remainder of this paper is that the appeal to the apparent “implausibility” of 
including HRD in the conditions of legitimacy results in “reasons of the wrong 
kind” to reject such a right. The tight definitional connection between human 
rights and international legitimacy standards (that functionalists presume) leads 
them to reject HRD out of the worry that that right’s violation licenses the use 
of military force to stop these violations (a worry that would indeed be justified 
if functionalism were the correct method of determining our conception of 
human rights). 
V.  WHO IS AFRAID OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY? 
Bernstein is by far not alone in tying together the ideas of (violating) 
human rights and (justified) humanitarian intervention in order to undermine 
the plausibility of HRD. Rawlsian functionalism rests on a general 
methodological assumption that not only Bernstein endorses. Fabienne Peter 
for example clarifies the “political” account of the nature of human rights 
when she “stresses the functional role of human rights, for example with regard 
to the justification of third-party interventions or the exclusion from the 
 
 47. See LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 86–87; see POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 
24, at 35–36. The concept of the “reasonable” in Rawls’ late philosophy has been another source 
of why many have been dissatisfied with Rawls’ and his followers’ approach. That Rawlsian 
functionalists are skeptical about the prospects of universal human rights has many reasons, one 
of them being that these orthodox accounts are too controversial under conditions of pluralism, 
especially on the global scale. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 24, at 36. I cannot explore the 
problems that come with the Rawlsian method of “reflective equilibrium” and with his 
conception of (global) “public reason.” However, it must be noted that one of the issues that 
separates Rawls and his followers, on the one hand, from those who defend human rights in the 
form of absolute, timeless, and objective standards, on the other, is that the functionalist approach 
allows contemporary normative practices and institutions to codetermine not just what the 
standards of global legitimacy are but what they ought to be. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 
24, at 37. Only when the diversity of all “reasonable” world views is made part of the 
methodology of human rights discourse, can the resulting human rights schedule be regarded as 
meeting the justificatory standards of global public reason. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 
24, at 217–18. I share the worry that this methodology potentially leads to a troublesome 
relativism that is especially regrettable when human rights are at stake. Unfortunately, I must 
leave that avenue of criticizing the Rawlsian framework aside in this paper. 
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international community.”48 And in opposition to those who regard human 
rights “as discovered rights that explicate certain universal moral facts,” the 
political conception of human rights (echoing Rawls’ and Bernstein’s 
accounts) rests on “contemporary human rights practice” that has “created a 
standard for international political legitimacy.”49 
As our analysis of Bernstein’s argument highlighted, the main problem 
with these “functionalist” and “political” conceptions of human rights is that 
they too often simply end up presuming what they have to establish, namely 
that a right to democracy is not an urgent and relevant enough moral claim. 
One of the functional roles of human rights is to present a catalogue of 
requirements that governments and states have to respect in order to enjoy the 
right to external nonintervention by third parties. If democracy were the proper 
object of such a legitimacy-enabling requirement it would follow that 
disrespecting it rendered governments illegitimate.50 And the Rawls-inspired 
minimalists about human rights conclude that, since illegitimacy is tantamount 
to the loss of the protections of sovereignty, human rights are functionally 
defined as those rights, the violation of which permits third party intervention. 
If HRD existed, it would follow that its violation justifies humanitarian 
 
 48. Fabienne Peter, A Human Right to Democracy? in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 481, 482 (R. Cruft, S. M. Liao, and M. Renzo eds., 2015). 
 49. Id. 
 50. David Miller, Is There a Human Right to Democracy? 2 (Ctr. for the Study of Soc. 
Justice Dep’t of Politics and Int’l Relations Working Paper, No. SJ032, 2015), http://www.poli 
tics.ox.ac.uk/materials/publications/13731/sj032is-there-a-human-right-to-democracy-final-ver 
sion.pdf (“If there is indeed a human right to democracy, and if, as many believe, for a state to be 
politically legitimate it must respect human rights, it immediately follows that the many 
undemocratic states that exist in today’s world are illegitimate, and don’t deserve the respect that 
we owe to all legitimate states.”) (demonstrating how Rawls’ functionalism has taken on this 
stronger form). In Rawls’ defense one must acknowledge that The Law of Peoples’ brief remarks 
on the role of human rights in its overall architectonic can be interpreted more charitably as I do 
in the text. When Rawls presents the argument, that I take to be one of the “founding documents” 
of contemporary functionalism (and minimalism), he says about his schedule of human rights that 
“[t]heir fulfillment is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other 
peoples . . .” RAWLS, supra note 14, at 80. Employing the terms used in the text, what Rawls says 
here is that not violating his minimal schedule of human rights (~VHR) suffices to render a 
society immune to humanitarian intervention (~JHI). Strictly speaking, this formulation does not 
say anything about those cases in which human rights are violated (VHR). We would commit the 
fallacy of denying the antecedent if we were to derive from Rawls’ original formulation (~VHR 
→ ~JHI) the logically different claim that the violation of human rights suffices to render 
humanitarian intervention justified (VHR → JHI). Still, Rawls himself at later points in The Law 
of Peoples where he discusses the case of (externally peaceful) outlaw states that internally 
violate human rights and, more importantly, the functionalist tradition that expands on his initial 
methodological statement, subscribe to the second claim that is also the subject of my paper, i.e., 
that the violation of human rights suffices to undermine a state’s immunity to external 
intervention. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 93–94. 
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intervention, a conclusion that we supposedly have to regard as overly 
demanding and politically dangerous.51 
The suggestion I submit is to reject the functionalists’ core assumption that 
human rights should be defined as those moral rights, the violation of which 
necessarily undermines a state’s legitimacy and, hence, vindicates the 
international community’s response in the form of military intervention (to 
stop that very violation). That defenders of the tight connection between 
human rights and humanitarian intervention have been growing in number is 
understandable in the face of recent events after the end of the Cold War.52 It is 
certainly true that the idea of “humanitarian intervention in the name of human 
rights” has been used (and abused) to justify military action that turned out to 
be motivated by anything but a genuine concern for human rights. It is also 
true that, in order to forestall the possibility of this kind of political 
exploitation of human rights, one way is to render the list of human rights as 
austere as possible. HRD is identified as an untenable idea, simply because 
humanitarian intervention in the name of nation building und democratization 
has been seen to result in inconvenient and even dangerous consequences. In 
order to protect the idea of human rights from becoming the instrument of 
dubious political decisions and military action we have to reserve the term 
“human rights” for a small subset of moral rights, namely those that really 
matter and the violation of which truly justifies the use of military action. 
 
 51. One issue that is conspicuously absent from the functionalist account of human rights is 
a clear analytical distinction regarding a normative complication that follows from the violation 
of human rights. That military humanitarian intervention is “justified” vis-a-vis a state that 
violates these rights can mean two things: it can mean, on the one hand, that third parties are now 
permitted to use force in order to ensure that the object of the human right is protected. On the 
other hand, such a justification can be read in the much stronger sense that the international 
community has a positive obligation to intervene in the cases in question. The conclusion 
concerning HRD that I develop in the text will apply to both versions of the functionalist account 
but will explicitly address the first variety (permissibility of intervention) only. The obvious 
reason for this choice is that undermining the permissibility of humanitarian intervention 
necessarily also undermines the obligation (but not the other way round). Opponents to HRD 
insist that not even the permissibility of such intervention can be justified, let alone an obligation. 
 52. See generally Humanitarian Intervention and relief – The Post-Cold War Era, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEW AMERICAN NATION, http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-
N/Humanitarian-Intervention-and-Relief-The-post-cold-war-era.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2016); 
Most recently, Russia has justified its military intervention in Eastern Ukraine and Syria in terms 
of protecting human rights (especially the human right to collective self-determination) as well as 
in terms of fighting international terrorism. Richard Gowen, U.S., Russia Duel Over 
Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and Ukraine, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Aug. 11, 2014), 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13990/u-s-russia-duel-over-humanitarian-interven 
tions-in-iraq-and-ukraine. The recent US led interventions and invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
too have partly been justified in terms of promoting the cause of human rights, one of them being 
the right to democratic self-government. Id. 
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However, this approach is not the only one available. We can protect the 
idea of human rights from getting abused for the purposes of militarily-driven 
intervention by means of severing the conceptual ties between human rights, 
on the one hand, and external intervention and its justification, on the other. 
We have to radically keep separated the question of what human rights there 
are (and how they are justified) from the question of what should be done in 
response to their violation. Admittedly, this suggestion too will strike many a 
reader as an extreme and implausible alternative. And indeed, the remainder of 
this paper will have to openly confront scenarios that seem to lend clear 
support to the minimalists’ insistence that (basic) human rights (proper) must 
be understood in terms of the functional role that only they play in 
international affairs, i.e., the role of legitimacy-granting devices. I will argue 
that even these cases can be dealt with within the alternative conceptual 
framework that I defend. The result of this conceptual reconfiguration will be 
that no one needs to be afraid of HRD, especially not those who worry that 
admitting HRD inescapably comes with legitimizing military intervention in 
the name of establishing and promoting democracies abroad. 
Let us begin by observing that an important cluster of normative concepts 
has been conspicuously absent in the above-rehearsed debate on human rights. 
These concepts are those prominently put at center stage in utilitarian and 
welfarist moral theories: “welfare,” “suffering,” “happiness,” and so forth. It is 
to some extent understandable why this is the case. Given the focus on the 
nature of rights that dominates not only the philosophical debates on human 
rights but also its politics, a preoccupation with deontological (as opposed to 
welfarist and utilitarian) approaches is to be expected. Individual (human) 
rights are one of the core elements of the deontological (“natural rights”) 
framework advocated by Locke, Kant, Rawls, and Nozick (to name just a few 
deontologists that advocate otherwise very diverse theories of justice).53 
Moreover, deontology is known for its stark opposition to utilitarian 
approaches to morality and justice that rest on the aforementioned welfarist 
concepts.54 The conflict between these two influential ethical theories becomes 
apparent, when we learn that according to the utilitarian maximizing aggregate 
welfare might very well justify compromising the status and rights of 
individual persons. Rawls and Nozick in particular have forcefully argued 
against this claim and have promoted the strict priority of certain inalienable 
rights that are not affected by considerations of well-being and utility.55 
Utilitarians have always had a strained relationship, vis-a-vis the idea of 
 
 53. See generally Deontological Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Dec. 
12, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (1971); ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 32–33 (1974). 
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absolute (natural) rights, understood as deontic side constraints on individual 
action and public policy. Bentham famously referred to the latter as “nonsense 
upon stilts.”56 If at all, rights play a restricted role in utilitarian thought.57 Their 
normative relevance is merely derivative of the more foundational 
considerations concerning the consequences that honoring such rights have for 
promoting the ultimate goal of maximizing (aggregate) utility and welfare. 
In order to overcome the conceptual impasse that I diagnosed with regard 
to the relationship between human rights and military intervention we need to 
reconsider the narrow methodological focus on deontological considerations in 
debates about human rights. We will be able to do so without thereby denying 
the crucial and indispensable role that traditional deontological notions such as 
respect for persons, autonomy and moral rights play for determining the proper 
schedule of human rights. On the contrary, also on the account defended here 
human rights and responses to their violation are strongly related with each 
other for the purposes of the justification of using military force on the 
international level. However, when it comes to the question of whether or not 
humanitarian intervention is conclusively justified, an exclusive focus on 
human rights, understood as a deontological category, will not satisfyingly 
answer it. The conceptual and definitional relationship between human rights 
(the definition’s definiendum) and humanitarian intervention in the face of 
their violation (the definition’s definiens) cannot be established. 
In order to better see what this argument about the interplay between 
deontological and welfarist considerations amounts to, let us introduce four 
cases. These cases illustrate the four logically conceivable scenarios that can 
be envisioned in terms of the relationship between deontological and utilitarian 
normative considerations, i.e., rights and welfare. In the first of these scenarios, 
we encounter a society in which certain urgent moral claims are violated but no 
large-scale suffering is present or expected as the result of these violations. In 
the second scenario, a society’s government does not violate such urgent 
deontic constraints, but is confronted with large scale suffering of its citizens. 
In the third scenario both states of affairs occur, rights are violated and large-
scale suffering occurs as a result of these violations. The fourth scenario 
exhibits neither rights violations nor large-scale suffering. 
Obviously, the fourth case is mentioned here merely to complete the set of 
logically possible combinations. Absent both any rights violations and any 
large scale suffering that threatens to afflict members of the society in 
question, the case for any third-party intervention on humanitarian grounds is 
justificatory void. In examples of the first kind rights are violated but no 
immediate and urgent suffering ensues because of this violation. This is the 
case when a government restricts liberties such as freedom of speech, religion, 
 
 56. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, ANARCHICAL FALLACIES 5 (1838). 
 57. Id. 
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and assembly without having to resort to any violent means to execute these 
restrictions. Of course, if the aforementioned rights and liberties are suppressed 
by means of inflicting significant amounts of suffering on the (resisting) 
population things are different. This variety of the first case obviously blends 
into the third type of case, the scenario that constitutes the least controversial 
one regarding humanitarian intervention. These are cases in which a 
government violently ignores urgent deontic moral claims of its citizens. I have 
to discuss a potential objection that emerges in conjunction with the distinction 
between cases one and three shortly. Before we move on to these intricacies, 
we need to acknowledge an important qualification regarding the second 
scenario though. This qualification will also help us with clarifying the 
relationship between the first and the third case. 
An uncontroversial example of scenario number two is a natural disaster 
striking a decent or just society. In this case large parts of the population are 
confronted with an event that is beyond their control and the control of those 
who govern them. According to the plausible conclusions of most secular and 
religious doctrines of global justice, such scenarios trigger international 
obligations, first and foremost the requirement to support the affected societies 
regarding the immediate disaster relief efforts.58 Moreover, long term 
assistance with rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, economic and educational 
facilities, and devastated agricultural lands are components of those obligations 
that other nations and international organizations have in the face of scenarios 
that fall into the second category. Forceful intervention, on the other hand, that 
consists in coercively providing the forms of assistance just mentioned is not 
considered a legitimate option. The suffering that is the result of a natural 
disaster is morally highly relevant, as the many available arguments for global 
duties of assistance clearly show; but the presence of large scale suffering in 
and of itself (that is, independently of how it came about) does not 
conclusively undermine a state’s sovereignty and its legitimacy, to put it in the 
terms that the defenders of functionalism have been using in the above 
arguments. 
However, it would be too quick if the analysis of scenario number two 
were to end at this point. How difficult it is to draw the line that separates 
scenarios of type two from those of type three (deontic claims violated and 
large-scale suffering) is shown in Amartya Sen’s groundbreaking work on 
famine.59 Sen has demonstrated that mass starvation is seldom the result of 
 
 58. See generally Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 
229, 231–32 (1972) (offering a utilitarian case for global justice); Thomas W. Pogge, World 
Poverty and Human Rights, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 1, 5(2005) (offering a deontological 
alternative). 
 59. See generally AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT 
AND DEPRIVATION (1982). 
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natural factors alone.60 In most cases it is institutional shortcomings, corrupt 
elites, and unjust regimes of socio-economic justice that turn a crop shortfall 
into an instance of large-scale suffering.61 In addition, the ensuing suffering 
can be the result of the governing elite’s deliberate refusal to accept foreign aid 
and assistance.62 This can happen out of national pride and arrogance, because 
of fear that foreign aid agencies publicize other grave domestic shortcomings, 
or because governments are worried that patterns of political and economic 
dependence will be the long term consequence of admitting foreign assistance 
on one’s soil. These varieties of the second scenario raise complicated issues, 
for example the philosophically controversial distinctions between doing and 
allowing, on the one hand, and intending and foreseeing, on the other.63 
However, it is quite clear that a government’s responsibility for bringing about 
the large scale suffering of victims of natural disasters is a highly relevant 
component in explaining why these varieties of the second scenario are 
actually located in the close normative vicinity of the clear-cut cases in which 
humanitarian intervention is justified (type three). The force-backed refusal to 
admit international aid (that, if it were admitted, would reduce the suffering of 
those in severe and life-threatening dire straits) is making many natural 
disasters resemble those cases in which governments lose their legitimacy and 
sovereignty because they actively inflict large-scale suffering. However, and 
this is the important conclusion regarding these complexities of the second 
type, the explanation for why we have gotten that close to dealing with a case 
of scenario number three is that we now have both components in place that 
the argument defended in this paper identifies as individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions for third-party intervention to be justified: large 
scale suffering, on the one hand, and the under-fulfillment of a right that is 
causally responsible for the occurrence of that suffering, on the other. In this 
case the rights violation consists in the regime’s refusal to satisfy the most 
basic needs and interests of its citizens, and given the fact that this satisfaction 
would have been possible, had the government not deliberatively restricted the 
provision of foreign aid. 
The set of even more intricate complications arises in the context of 
distinguishing scenarios of type one (violation of moral rights but no large 
scale suffering) from examples of type three (violation of moral rights plus 
large scale suffering). This complication can be summarized in the form of an 
objection that the functionalist minimalist might employ. Contrary to what has 
been argued so far, there seem to be cases of deontic moral claims that, when 
 
 60. Id. at 39–44. 
 61. Id. at 1. 
 62. Id. at 86–112. 
 63. See generally FRANCES KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITY, AND 
PERMISSIBLE HARM 17–26, 30–31 (2007). 
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violated, constitute sufficient justificatory grounds for humanitarian 
intervention and military force. These deontic constraints, for example the 
prohibition of systematic torture and genocide, are in themselves so urgent and 
morally powerful that their violation deprives states and governments of their 
legitimacy, period. Crucially, utilitarian appeals to welfare considerations and 
to the suffering and wellbeing of individuals do not seem to play any decisive 
role in these special cases of scenario three. The pure outrage of the 
constraints’ violation suffices to legitimize the use of military force in order to 
put an end to this violation. If that were true, however, we would have 
resurrected the functionalist’s rationale for human rights minimalism: There 
would be those deontic moral claims that share the exclusive property of their 
violation in itself constituting sufficient justification for forceful intervention. 
Violating claims to democratic self-government obviously falls short of such a 
justification for military intervention. Hence, democratic rights cannot count as 
a member of this exclusive subset of moral rights. We are back at square one 
because the functionalist’s rationale for minimizing the schedule of human 
rights (and for excluding HRD from it) remains viable. 
However, this is too quick and the minimalist’s proclamation of victory 
over HRD is again premature. The reason is that even those cases of rights, 
such as the prohibition of systematic torture and genocide that seem to provide 
sufficient, welfare-independent, grounds for justified humanitarian intervention 
do not do so on closer inspection. The rejoinder to the functionalist objection is 
that even in these special cases we can and should continue to make the 
analytical distinction between the right that is violated, on the one hand, and 
the suffering that ensues in case of its violation, on the other. The deontic and 
the welfarist components retain their independence and as long as this is the 
case the functionalist cannot establish a subset of unique rights that alone 
exhibits a definitional relationship with the sufficient vindication of 
humanitarian intervention. 
Take the examples of genocide and widespread systematic torture. The 
reason for why we are tempted to make the shortcut of declaring the violation 
of the rights against torture and genocide to be sufficient grounds for justified 
third party intervention is that in these cases there is indeed an inherent 
connection between the right being violated and large scale suffering ensuing 
as a consequence of it. It is practically and empirically impossible to commit 
an act of large scale murder (on the grounds of the victims’ ethnic, religious, 
etc. affiliations) without at the same time inflicting a large amount of suffering 
on many human individuals. There are then indeed cases in which the 
occurrence of a rights violation is always accompanied by quantities and 
qualities of systematically inflicted misery that are so horrible that they cannot 
be ignored by the international community and ask it to stop these rights 
violations. 
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Still, and this is the controversial suggestion which I defend in conclusion, 
the rationale for why genocide triggers the international permissibility (and 
probably obligation) to forcefully interfere with the internal affairs of an 
otherwise sovereign state consists of the two separate components defended 
above that have to occur together in all instances of type three scenarios. It is 
true that these two components are more easily distinguishable in the case of, 
for example, the right to free speech: violating free speech rights often results 
in the first type of case in which the respective deontic claim of equal respect is 
violated but no large scale suffering ensues because of this violation. In the 
variety of cases of type three, on the other hand, when free speech rights are 
suppressed violently, the very same two-part distinction continues to hold but 
suffering actually ensues. The complication emerges because in some type 
three scenarios this distinction holds on the conceptual and normative level 
only. In the case of genocide, the violation of the deontic component consists 
in the disrespectful treatment of the victims’ status as persons culminating in a 
direct attack on their existences as autonomous and self-determining agents. 
This is a moral outrage. However, notice that this is an outrage that does not 
exclusively attach to rights against genocide and torture; it is implicated in 
exactly the same way when freedom of conscience, speech, religion, 
association, and, well, the freedom to collective self-determination are attacked 
and severely curtailed by those in power. Consequently, these deontologically-
conceived moral outrages can be isolated in all cases that are subsumed in 
categories one and three. It is why we can talk about human rights being 
violated there. The large scale suffering that automatically ensues in some type 
three scenarios remains a separate and independent normative consideration 
that is not conceptually indistinguishable from the specific moral outrage 
constituted by the human rights violation itself, which is the same in all 
scenarios of type one and three. 
Now the relevance of successfully defending this strict conceptual 
separateness of rights violations from the suffering that they generate is that we 
have successfully protected the conceptual space that is needed for the 
possibility of HRD in the face of the functionalist challenge. Keep in mind that 
if that defense had been unsuccessful the minimalists would have carried the 
day: they would again have been able to carve out a unique subcategory of 
rights, namely those rights that satisfy the functionalists’ criterion, i.e., that 
their violation suffices to justify humanitarian intervention.64 In order to reject 
the possibility of this subcategory, my strategy was to discuss the difference 
between the two types of scenarios (one and three) and to highlight that they 
always are in an important respect analogous. They both exhibit rights 
violations of the same kind (disrespect, attack on the equal moral status of 
 
 64. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 79–80, 80 n.23. 
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persons, etc.) even though in type three there are some cases in which this 
violation is inevitably accompanied by large scale and immediate suffering. 
Even in these latter cases, however, it is still both of these factors that only 
when taken together provide the rationale for justified third party intervention. 
Hence, my claim is that no deontic right is of the kind that its elevated 
status of being a human right depends on its violation alone constituting 
sufficient grounds for humanitarian intervention (not even the rights against 
torture and genocide are of this kind). Consequently, the fact that democratic 
rights (in and of themselves) do not fulfill the criterion of their violation 
sufficing for such intervention to be justified does not constitute a case for 
declaring it to be impossible qua human right. As it turns out, no moral right 
satisfies this criterion! Most instances of cases that involve HRD fall squarely 
into scenarios of type number one, in which state authorities undermine 
democratic practices and hinder democratic reform without actually resorting 
to violent means. There, democratic rights can still be human rights even if 
their violation does not suffice to vindicate humanitarian intervention (because 
no large scale and immediate suffering ensues in the course of their violation). 
HRD can be a human right because not even those cases of type number three 
(that involve rights that automatically implicate large scale suffering) lend 
support to the minimalists’ strategy of carving out yet another subcategory of 
rights that then gets labeled “human rights (proper).” 
This argument in response to the latter part of the attack on HRD has been 
complex but is successful for the conceptual and normative purposes pursed 
here. Even in the special cases of type three the moral rights in question do not 
in and of themselves satisfy the functionalist criterion of their violation 
sufficing to justify humanitarian intervention. Even in their case it is a rights 
violation plus related suffering that constitutes that justification; not the 
violation of the right taken by itself. No one needs to be afraid of HRD then on 
the grounds that it commits us to the dangerous practical and political outcome 
of having to forcefully intervene in non-democratic societies. No human right 
in itself, qua deontic constraints on individual action and international politics, 
has this kind of power. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
My strategy for defending the normative conceptual space in which a 
possible HRD is located has consisted of two parts. The first stage of my 
response to “functionalist minimalists” (Rawls, Bernstein, and Peter) went 
along with their central methodological assumption that human rights have to 
play a specific role in international affairs. That assumption is that the precious 
label of “human rights” must attach only to those moral claims that vindicate 
harsh international reactions when these claims are not respected since their 
violation sufficiently undermines the perpetrating state’s legitimacy and 
sovereignty. I argued that these functionalists fail to avoid the fallacy of 
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“begging the question” when they try to draw a wedge between standards of 
international legitimacy, on the one hand, and standards of (liberal) justice, on 
the other, and try to exclude democratic rights from the schedule of human 
rights on the basis of that distinction. They merely presume that it is 
“obviously” “implausible” (given the current state of the world) to consider 
democracy to be an international standard of legitimacy as opposed to a 
parochial demand of liberal conceptions of domestic justice. 
The second part of my rejoinder attacked the functionalist methodology 
directly. The problem with functionalism lies with its central methodological 
presupposition, which comes with defining human rights in terms of particular 
responses that the international community should engage in (in response to 
their violation). That presupposition, together with the plausible political desire 
to reduce the use (and abuse) of military force qua means of human rights 
policy, ultimately results in “reasons of the wrong kind” for rejecting the 
possibility of HRD. A couple of intricate complications emerged in the course 
of refuting functionalist minimalism. Most critically, we saw that in order to 
ensure that HRD is in fact possible we have to defend the controversial claim 
that there are no moral rights (not even those against genocide and systematic 
government-sponsored torture) that sufficiently vindicate humanitarian 
intervention. Even in these cases, in which we are tempted to regard the rights-
violation alone as sufficient grounds for the use of force, it is the rights-
violation plus large scale suffering that together constitute that jointly 
sufficient set of normative conditions. We had to establish this stronger claim 
in order to block the minimalists’ rejoinder of carving up yet another subset of 
rights that then again were to exclude democratic rights from belonging to 
“human rights (proper).” 
Whether HRD actually is justified is of course a different story that has to 
wait for another occasion.65 In order to make the positive case for HRD we 
need substantive arguments that come in instrumentalist, intrinsic, and 
constitutivist varieties.66 This paper engaged in the seemingly more modest 
project of refuting a particular and popular argumentative strategy that 
opponents of HRD use. That particular strategy has been shown to be 
misguided. It defends a reason of the wrong kind to reject the possibility of 
HRD. There still might be other reasons for rejecting HRD; nothing I said in 
this paper rules out this outcome. However, the functionalists’ argument for 
curtailing our schedule of human rights to a minimally short and uninspiringly 
modest one does not constitute such a reason. What human rights there are and 
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 66. Christiano, supra note 13, at 1, 2, 44 nn.i–iv(presenting some of the most powerful 
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what should be done in response to their violation are by definition distinct 
concerns, the latter having to be answered in partly welfarist terms that go 
beyond the deontic content of any human rights taken by themselves. 
 
